A significant circumstance was the fact that the Stoic philosophy, in the eventide of its existence, produced three men of such nobility of mind as Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius. In their more developed type of thought, Stoicism was best represented. In their hands, indeed, Stoicism became the noblest of imperfect ethical theories. Marcus Aurelius was the last of the significant Stoics, one, too, in whom pagan ethical philosophy reached its greatest depth, and its finest flowering.
The Stoicism of the time had become an eclectic religious movement, and the old pantheism of the school had given way, it seems not too much to say, to thought of more theistic tendency. Abandonment to the Will of Deity, and impregnable concentration or entrenchment in one's self, despite the moral and intellectual loneliness which such individuality may involve, are the assiduous inculcations of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius. His "Meditations"-the last great product of Stoicism-had a certain inner and mystical affinity with the Neo-Platonism that should follow-a result not to be wondered at when philosophy became, in the Emperor's mystic speculation, so largely concerned with the affairs of practical life. The enforcement of virtuous life has precedence, with him, over subtle speculation as to the origin of things. For interest had been transferred from metaphysical speculation to practical ethics. For all that, his system is not without metaphysical foundation: this is found in its theory of Nature, as moral support and guide. His discussions of ethical problems are neither systematic nor exhaustive-there is no attempt to make them so. His work is not an intellectual system of the Universe: the ethical philosophy it presents does not derive from being part of a philosophical system which offers itself as an organic whole. There is, however, this fundamental conception underlying all his teaching, namely, that all things form one whole, and constitute a unity. He teaches that this whole is so wisely ordered that the wisdom of each part lies, after the Stoic teleology, in seeking the good of the whole. Hence the Emperor can say,-"All parts of the Universe are interwoven and tied together with a sacred bond. And no one thing is foreign or unrelated to another. This general connection gives unity and ornament to the world. For the world, take it altogether, is but one" 1 ). Again he says, "If thou didst ever see a hand cut off, or a foot, or a head lying anywhere apart from the rest of the body, such does a man make himself, as far as he can, who is not content with what happens, and separates limself from others, or does anything selfish. If you have ietached yourself from the natural unity-for you were made by Nature a part, but now you have cut yourself off-yet, in your :ase, there is this beautiful provision, that it is in your power again to unite yourself" 2 ). Once more says Aurelius, "He that frets himself because things do not happen just as he would have them, and secedes and separates himself from the law of universal nature, is but a sort of ulcer of the world, never considering that the same cause which produced the displeasing accident made him too. And lastly, he that is selfish, and cuts off his own soul from the universal soul of all rational beings, is a kind of voluntary outlaw" 3 ). We thus see the world to be objectively conceived by Aurelius as a unified thing-a cosmos to which all belong. The alternative is always present to him-"either Providence or atoms rule the Universe" 4 ). He has his own position clearly defined, however, in his preference for Providence, with its 0 VII. 9. 2) VIII. 34. boundless possibilities and hopes, rather than chance, with its attendant resignation. Very beautiful is the completeness of his contentment with all things-"All things are harmonious to me which are harmonious to thee, 0 Universe. Nothing is for me too early or too late which is in due time for thee. All is fruit to me which thy seasons, 0 Nature, bear. From thee are all things, and in thee all, and all return to thee. The poet says 'Dear City of Cecrops!' Shall I not say 'Dear City of God'?" 5 )
His view of man's duty, therefore, is to live agreeably to the course of Nature, and harmoniously with other men. But, of course, the fact of evil is a trouble in face of the Providence to which reference has been made. But Stoical courage simply refused to admit the fact, and took the world for perfect. Such evil as there might be must be for the general good. This is precisely one of the defects of the moral philosophy of Aurelius, that the reality of the antagonism of evil to the good is not more decisively felt, and so, too, with respect to the reality of righteousness. A heart that should beat more violently in sympathy with practical triumphs of righteousness, than the pilosophy of Aurelius compelled, was something that could come only by that teaching being transcended.
Sincere as Stoical thought always remained, it seems lacking in thoroughness here. The Deity that, for the Emperor, rules and pervades all things is one that might very well suggest the Deity of monotheism. Only, acquiescence in the Divine will here partakes too much of indifference to what may occur, and acceptance of what must, as though it were some fate which neither divinity nor humanity can change. For, though Marcus Aurelius, like Epictetus and Seneca, attains some sense of the personality of Deity, yet it is by no means uniform or persistent.
To the ethical philosophy of Aurelius, the soul was indestructible-the dominant and guiding principle of life. In its principle of reason, he found the secret of man's relationship to man, no less than to God, the universal reason. Hence he can say, "Though 5 ) IV. 23.
we are not just of the same flesh and blood, yet our minds are nearly related" 6 ). This brotherhood of man, says Aurelius, will lead us not only to strive for the common good, but to pity and forgive. Man's relation to the Deity is, in Stoical ethics, of fundamental importance. They make God and reason finely identical, and our true good, therefore, lies in conformity with the mind and will of Deity. The life of reason is, therefore, that whereon Aurelius insists. "Hold in honour your opinionative faculty, for this alone is able to prevent any opinion from originating in your guiding principle that is contrary to Nature, or the proper constitution of a rational creature" 7 ). For, in Stoical thought, a rational nature is subjectively conceived to belong to all. 'Tis in keeping with such a nature the Emperor says, "If any man is able to convince nie, and shew me that I do not think or act right, I will gladly change, for I seek the truth, by which no man was ever injured. But he is injured who abides in his error and ignorance". Such then, is the Emperor's firmly enounced doctrine of humanity, with tie dignity and duty that pertain to every man, and every man's vork. And if, according to Stoic fatalism, everything is necessarily determined, the determination is along lines that must be optimistically conceived. So the nobility of the Emperor, in keeping with tiis, says, "It is not seemly that I, who willingly have brought sorrow to none, should permit myself to be sad".
When we turn to the Stoic theory of virtue, as represented b Aurelius, we find the inwardness of virtue remarkable, and it ii absolutely self-sufficing. The good man is lord of his own Ife: he is such a king among men, by reason of virtue, as had lever before been dreamed. Thus arose the conception of the impossible wise man of Stoical thought. And the impossibility of lie realisation led to its becoming tempered, in the later developnents, with practical and practicable forms and insistences.
The Emperor's inculcations contain very much that is un-(oubtedly excellent, as to the wisdom of life. Powerless were the 6 ) II. 1.
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) III. 9. 18* darts of destiny against the inner refuge of Aurelius, with his lofty tranquillity of mind, and deep quickening of soul. The chief iault I should find with it is that it leads too much to passive and quietistic excellencies, and has too few insistences on the active forth-puttings of heroic virtue. I mean, we can easily fear disturbance too much, and carry the limits of prudence too far. It seems to us more important to have the soul cultivate the plenitude of its own energy and power for the performance of actively and generously heroic virtue. When the soul is too exclusively thrown back upon itself, there are attendant dangers of pride and selfconfidence. Still, quietistic excesses apart, the insistence on the importance of being, rather than knowing or doing, has its own value. Those petty and untoward things, towards which Stoicism fosters a contemptuous disregard, may, under higher and more positive ethical law, become sources of joy, strength, and worth. The Stoical theory of good and evil-both alike absolute-came to be modified, and room and place found for things as human and actually existent. The egoistic and altruistic tendencies were not perfectly harmonized, the stress remaining mainly on the former, and the essentially social character of virtue being imperfectly drawn, even though a certain utilitarian interest and tendency are far from wanting in the teaching of Aurelius.
The future life is left in uncertainty by the Emperor, though he seems not without some sense of the continuance of life after death. He scarcely ever touches on the question. He prefers to centre attention on the life of the present. "Though you were to live three thousand, or, if you please, thirty thousand years, yet remember that no man can lose any other life than that which he now lives, neither is he possessed of any other than that wich he loses" 8 ). But his reasoning is as noble as it is peculiar, in this connection, for, just because we have but this all too brief life, we must the more be careful to live it well. "Hark ye, friend; you have been a burgher of this great city, what matter 8 ) II. 14.
thiough you have lived iu it five years or three; if you have observed thie laws of the corporation, the length or shortness of the time miakes no difference" 9 ).
It will be seen, from all that has now been advanced, that tthe ethical philosophy of Stoics, like the Emperor, came short in tliiis, that it set out from the formal principle of ethical law, and ntever got the length of the real principle on which goodness, right, amd duty must depend. Its whole conception of the principle rceraains too abstractly conceived: the right, the good, the ideal, nnust be chosen for their own sakes, but still it is not brought out w/herein the right, the good, the ideal do actually consist. Its tlheory of virtue never transcends itself. The virtue remains diefective, in that it consists too much in outward action, to the meglect or disparagement of such interior dispositions as charity, beneficence, tenderness, and spontaneous love. In this way of tlhinking, there is the tendency, too, to retire too readily from the world, and to sacrifice too little to save and improve it. At any rate, 'tis but a cold and soul-desolating ideal to which it can aittaiu, by dint of proud and self-reliant will. Virtue thus becomes easily too personal and subjective.
The ethical philosophy of Stoicism, at its highest, had need to be lifted into the sphere of personality, and the realm of endsrational ends for which alone self-denial or renunciation is necessary. But then it will have passed out of the twilight of abstraction into the sphere of noonday-the light of real principles, principles of love that concern persons, human and divine. We are not now concerned to follow it thither. It is enough now to note how far Stoic speculation can carry us.
With Aurelius, as with Epictetus, man's own self-development is that with which nothing in the shape of outward circumstance must be allowed to interfere. But he overlooks too largely the warfare within, no less than without. Nor is destiny, from a higher view point, merely the cross-grained thing it seemed to these Stoic philosophers. Still, high credit must be given to Stoical ») XII. 36. thought for the way in which it advanced on Aristotle, and anticipated later and higher thought, in teaching the will of man to conform-in virtue of its free internal dispositions-to the outer limitations imposed on man's power. Its modified determinism made strength of will the prime requisite of man's adjustment to the world's order, and of his control of passion.
A graver and more severe law is required than the Stoical obedience to the law of nature and reason, even though we admit the value of the sacrifice of desire to this Stoical subordination to Nature's law. The life of pure reason is, to Stoical thought, the true life, for the rational is, for it, as we have seen, the real. But such life of pure reason can never be the true, the ideal, life; for not apathy or indifference is our need, but always more and fuller life. Life is the one thing needful; life laughs to scorn oppositions, troubles, losses, failures, and makes them minister to its own progress and development. Life must be at once intense and expansive, so shall it be generous and fruitful.
To the Emperor Marcus Aurelius must be accorded high, though discriminating, praise for his contribution towards the imperishable glory of Stoical ethics, in his setting forth of the intrinsic worth of moral personality, the triumph of man's selfconquest, the actualism of energetic fulfilment of duty in midst of his scheme of lofty idealism, the fundamental place of Divine order or law; for these, and such like insistences, made the Emperor the important connecting link he was between pagan and Christian thought.
